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Matthew Partridge reviews The Force of Obedience, a book on the corruption and
corporatism at work in Tunisia, and how the rhetoric of “modernisation” has in some
cases been used to justify policies that have increased the power of the state.
The Force of  Obedience: The Polit ical Economy of  Repression in Tunisia.
Béatrice Hibou. Polity. June 2011.
Find this book:  
In 2008, a U.S. State Department of f icial sent a dispirit ing cable
back to Washington D.C. ent it led “Corrupt ion in Tunisia: What ’s
Yours is Mine”. It  began, “According to Transparency Internat ional’s
annual survey and Embassy contacts’ observat ions, corrupt ion in
Tunisia is gett ing worse. Whether it  is cash, services, land, property,
or yes, even your yacht, President Ben Ali’s family is rumoured to
covet it  and reportedly gets what it  wants”. However, according
to Béatrice Hibou’s The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy
of Repression in Tunisia, this inst itut ionalised theft  was not just  a
consequence of  Ali’s dictatorship, but was one of  the many means
by which he used economic controls to ensure polit ical dominance.
In part icular, Hibou argues that this “corrupt ion” did not just  extend to the bribes and
expropriat ion that other students of  Tunisian polit ics have focused on, but also encompassed
a wide-ranging series of  discret ionary intervent ions that enabled the regime to set  up what she
describes as a “policing state”. Under this system the rule of  law was replaced with “a whole series
of micro-decisions which foster the meshing of  logics characterist ic of  Tunisian modes of
government” and “make the control and individual surveillance of  everyone possible”.
Roughly a f if th of  The Force of Obedience is spent invest igat ing banking, where this mixture of
corporat ism, paternalism and corrupt ion was most apparent. For instance, debtor-f riendly laws
prevented the collect ion of  bad debts and discouraged domest ic investment. As a consequence,
access to credit  was determined by polit ical connect ions as much as management competence,
access to credit  was determined by polit ical connect ions as much as management competence,
while f inancial inst itut ions themselves depended on deposits f rom the myriad of  state f irms to
survive. Hibou illustrates this process by cit ing the case of  BIAT (Banque Internat ionale Arabe de
Tunisie), which was severely punished af ter its founder crit icized the economic policies of  Ali’s
regime.
Even the more tradit ional security mechanisms made extensive use of  economic networks.
Although Tunisia was heavily policed, the heavily regulated taxi sector was required to spy on
passengers, as much to int imidate the populat ion and spread “the idea that everything is being
listened to, including the most anodyne discussions”, as to gather intelligence. Similarly, the
punishment of  dissidents focused on making them unemployable by conf iscat ing their
qualif icat ions and putt ing them under de-facto house arrest . The overall aim of  these measures
was to “set  a person apart , ostracize him and exclude him, subject  him to t rials and tribulat ions,
and increase the sense of  vanity associated with polit ical communicat ion”.
Although economic problems and pressure f rom internat ional inst itut ions would force Ben Ali to
repeatedly pledge to inst itute economic reforms, Hibou argued that most of  the controls
persisted. Chapters 8 and 9 focus on how the changes were either lef t  incomplete or deliberately
subverted.  One tact ic was to “restructure” the enterprises immediately before their movement to
the private sector by lumbering them with uneconomic contracts and obligat ions, leading to
f inancial instability which forced them to cont inue their dependence on the Tunisian state. In other
cases, their ownership was simply t ransferred to another public body with only a nominal amount
of  capital moved to the private sector.
Indeed, the rhetoric of  “modernisat ion” was used in some cases to just ify policies that increased
the power of  the state. From the middle of  the 1990s the government gave large f iscal incent ives
to f irms who were willing to commission research from private consultancies as to how they could
adopt new processes and technologies. Although Hibou scrupulously acknowledges that the
efforts init ially boosted product ivity, the business community quickly became disillusioned at  the
“proliferat ion of  intervent ions” where “studies are carried out because studies need to be carried
out; enterprises f ind their hand forced to enter the program, to publicize it , to take part  in
delegat ions abroad and to vaunt the merits of  Tunisia”.
Of course, Hibou has a preference for jargon and her style can be ponderous, though this may be
due to the translat ion. The role that France played in enabling Ali could have been developed
further, especially given that the Tunisian intelligence service were able to burglarise Hibou’s
off ices. Instead of  simply rewrit ing the introduct ion for the updated edit ion (the original was writ ten
in 2004/5 and published in 2006), it  might have been worthwhile to include an addit ional chapter on
why the system of repression f inally collapsed.
However, these shortcomings do not prevent The Force of Obedience becoming a powerful
reminder that, to paraphrase President Obama’s recent speech, the future of  the Arab world will
depend on the interact ions between street vendors and those in power.
This review was originally published on the British Politics and Policy at LSE blog.
——————————————————————————————-
Dr Matthew Partridge completed a PhD in Economic History in 2011 at  the London School of
Economics. A senior writer for MoneyWeek, he has also writ ten for The Guardian, Times Higher
Educat ion and the websites of  Prospect and New Statesman. Read reviews by Matthew.
Related posts:
1. “What we were told now seems hopelessly opt imist ic”: examining the role of  Government in
Ireland’s economic turmoil (9.2)
2. Opt imism about the Arab Spring has gone too far (6.4)
3. The Struggle for Egypt: f rom Nasser to Tahrir Square (6.1)
4. Book Review: The Rise and Fall of  an Economic Empire, With Lessons for Aspiring
Economies, by Colin Read (5.6)
5. Book Review: Spain’s ‘Second Transit ion’: The Socialist  Government of  Jose Luis Rodriguez
Zapatero, edited by Bonnie N. Field (5.6)
This entry was posted in Africa and the Middle East, Economics and Business Studies, Matthew
Partridge, Polit ics and Internat ional Relat ions, Polity and tagged Arab Spring, banking, corrupt ion,
crime, economy, France, Tunisia. Bookmark the permalink. Edit
